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Public and Expert Voices in the Legal Regulation of Technology 
 
Patrick Bishop and Stuart Macdonald 
 
 
Introduction 
The law in isolation is seldom, if ever, an adequate regulatory device. As Black contends in her 
exposition of decentred regulation: “… governments do not […] have a monopoly on regulation […] 
regulation is occurring within and between other social actors” (Black, 2001, p103).  Indeed, the use 
of alternative instruments to achieve regulatory goals has proliferated in recent times; Thaler and 
Sunstein’s influential “nudge” theory (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009) is one obvious manifestation of the 
preference on the part of policy makers for non-regulatory solutions to social problems. But whilst 
innovation in the design of policy instruments is laudable, there remains a place for more traditional 
command and control regulation. As Macrory notes, “it remains equally important to ensure that the 
qualities of transparency, accountability, and enforceability inherent in the more formal legal 
structures are not lost” (Macrory, 2001, p647). 
The focus of this chapter is the legal regulation of technology. In one sense, to distinguish between 
the regulation of technology and the regulation of other things is a false dichotomy. Technology does 
not exist in a vacuum and any regulation of it is essentially concerned with limiting and controlling 
the uses that may be made of technology by humans. In short, any form of legal regulation is 
concerned with behavioural control and regulating technology is no exception.  In another sense, 
however, the targeted activity of any regulatory scheme will influence both its creation and eventual 
operation and here the highly specialist and complex nature of technology – and its associated risks – 
are certainly capable of raising distinct challenges. The chapter examines three technological areas 
which have been subjected to legal regulation: human fertilisation and embryology; the manufacture 
and distribution of chemicals; and, the disposal of hazardous waste. Whilst these activities, and the 
regimes which regulate them, are quite different, they do share two basic common features. First, the 
activities themselves are necessary and/or socially beneficial. And, second, the activities also have the 
potential to cause considerable harm – at both the individual and societal level – if left unregulated.  
Efforts to regulate activities like these face various challenges. For a start, efforts at legal regulation of 
technology struggle to keep apace with scientific advances. This has been characterised as a race 
between the ‘hare’ of technology against the ‘tortoise’ of law (Stokes, 2012, p93). It is also apparent 
that despite an initial period free of regulation, new high-tech products and processes are eventually 
caught by a bespoke regulatory net or, failing that, fall within existing regulatory regimes with broad 
and overlapping remits (Friedman, 2001).  
A further challenge, which is the focus of this chapter, is managing the frequent tension between 
public and expert opinion. Technological advancement is a key ingredient of the ‘new modernity’ 
conceptualised by Beck: “ in social science's understanding of modernity, the plough, the steam 
locomotive and the microchip are visible indicators of a much deeper process, which comprises and 
reshapes the entire social structure" (Beck, 1992, p.51). This reshaped social structure is “… 
increasingly preoccupied with the future (and also with safety), which generates the notion of risk” 
(Giddens, 1999, p.3). Any legal regime tasked with the regulation of risk is necessarily complex and 
multifarious and involves the input of science and expertise (to provide assessments of risk) and the 
public at large in order to gauge society’s response to particular dangers and their likelihood. These 
drivers of regulatory design and approach will often (if not inevitably) exist in mutual tension. This 
chapter will explore this tension via an analysis of three distinct regulatory regimes. These regimes 
have been chosen as they each have different structures and legislative underpinnings: UK domestic 
law (Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990), EU law (REACH Regulation 2006) and 
international law (Basel Convention 1989). Before turning to these, the chapter begins by examining 
the role public participation plays in legal regulation in general, and the tension between this objective 
and considerations of resource and expertise. 
 
Public and expert voices in regulatory design: the theory 
The literature on principles of ‘good regulation’ reveals a high level of consensus regarding the 
importance of public participation (Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, 2012; Regulating Better, 2004; 
Mandelkern Group on Better Regulation, 2001; Regulatory Performance Indicators, 1999). In 
environmental matters the importance of public participation has been fully recognised at the 
international level (Aarhus, 1998). The rationale for enhanced participatory rights is rooted in 
democratic concerns, particularly in the context of non-majoritarian regulatory bodies. As Abbot and 
Lee have noted: 
The political nature of environmental decisions, together with their frequent delegation to 
unelected experts, requires public participation to enhance the procedural legitimacy of 
decisions, since electoral legitimacy is weak. (Abbot and Lee, 2003, p.84) 
In addition to justifications based on democracy, there is also ample support for the view that 
decisions and policies made as a result of a participatory process produce higher quality results than 
would be the case absent any public input (Abbot and Lee, 2003, p.83; McGarity, 1990, p.112). The 
basis of such an argument is that public participation is able to broaden the regulator’s lens beyond 
the purely technical aspects of the particular regulatory regime, which in turn will allow the regulator 
to view issues from different perspectives (McGarity, 1990, p.112). Theoretical support for this may 
be gleaned from the social science research methodology known as ‘triangulation’, which involves the 
“use of more than one approach to the investigation of a research question in order to enhance 
confidence in the ensuing findings” (Bryman, 2004, p.1143). It is also important to note that, despite 
the often technical nature of regulatory regimes, expertise alone is incapable of providing a complete 
solution to most regulatory challenges. As McGarity has opined: “… many, if not most, important 
health and environmental questions are in fact not resolvable by the experts. The available 
information and the state of the scientific art is often so poor that the experts can at best hazard highly 
uncertain educated guesses.” (McGarity,1990, p.105). Even where experts are able to provide a 
reasonably accurate assessment of risks this in no way provides an answer to the vexed societal 
question of how much risk is acceptable. In this regard the public “can provide useful information on 
matters such as public fears and values” (Abbot and Lee, 2003, p.82). Finally, involvement in the 
decision making process provides interested parties with a better understanding of how decisions are 
made which in turn has the potential to reduce the scope for judicial review (McGarity, 1990, p.112).  
In spite of these benefits, there are two sets of concerns about public participation. The first are 
practical, and focus on operational efficiency. In a world of finite resources, it is inevitable that cost 
minimisation and efficiency concerns will permeate the design and operation of any regulatory 
regime. As discussed below, this is certainly the case with the three areas of regulation considered in 
this chapter. In such a context, it is generally accepted that public participation will have considerable 
resource implications, both in terms of money and time (Abbot and Lee, 2003, p.87; McGarity, 1990, 
p.112). Moreover, an over-emphasis on participation as a condition precedent of regulatory action has 
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the potential to damage a regulator’s ability to respond to issues in a timely manner: “more 
participation might lead to less effective decision making and eventually to stagnation in the 
regulatory system” (Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, 2012, p.29).  
By contrast, the second set of concerns focuses not on resources but on the ability of the public to 
engage in what are often technical, even esoteric debates. As Eden has noted:  
[O]ne of the circumstances that can militate against this admirable objective is where 
discussions are dominated by ‘experts’ of one sort or another. This precludes wide public 
involvement by defining the discussions as the exclusive preserve of ‘experts’ (Eden, 1996, 
p.183).  
This view is shared by a number of commentators (Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, 2012, p.29; Lee and 
Abbot, 2003, p.84; McGarity, 1990, p.113). However, whilst members of the public “have not always 
had the power or the confidence of their own ‘expertise’ to raise their criticisms forcefully” (Eden, 
1996, p.191), Baldwin, Cave and Lodge point out that in Beck’s ‘risk society’ there is a “new political 
dialogue built on the death of deference to those claiming special expertise” (Baldwin, Cave and 
Lodge, 2012, p.30). Moreover, any attempt to preclude public debate on the basis that only ‘experts’ 
are capable of reaching an appropriate decision undermines the democratic foundations on which 
public participation is based and the legitimacy of any subsequent decisions.  
Having outlined this tension between public participation on the one hand and operational efficiency 
and expertise on the other, the chapter will now examine how these considerations have been 
managed in three contrasting regulatory regimes specific to differing technological contexts.  
 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Following the birth in the UK in 1978 of the first child conceived through in vitro fertilisation (IVF), 
a Committee of Inquiry was established in 1982 under the chairmanship of Dame Mary Warnock to 
consider the social, ethical and legal implications of the advances in human fertilisation and 
embryology and to make recommendations on the policies and safeguards that should be applied. 
When it was published in 1984, one of the Warnock report’s principal recommendations was the 
creation of an independent regulatory authority (Department of Health & Social Security, 1984). This 
body would have both executive and advisory functions, and would include not only representation 
from the scientific and medical communities but also lay members in order to ensure public 
confidence and participation (ibid, para 13.4). 
Following the Warnock report’s recommendations, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 
1990 (the 1990 Act) established the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA). The 
HFEA’s functions include, first, licensing and monitoring: clinics that carry out IVF and donor 
insemination treatment; centres that carry out human embryo research; and, the storage of gametes 
and embryos. Activities which infringe this regulatory framework, such as unlicensed treatment, 
constitute a criminal offence (1990 Act, s 41). Second, the HFEA issues a Code of Practice and 
maintains formal registers of information about donors, fertility treatments and children born as a 
result of these treatments. And, third, the HFEA publicises its role and provides advice and 
information to patients, donors and clinics. The HFEA currently has 12 members.
1
 These members 
have a range of expertise, including medicine, law, religion and philosophy. To encourage an 
independent view, the HFEA requires that at least half of its members (including the Chair and 
Deputy) are not doctors or scientists involved in human embryo research or fertility treatment. 
Whilst stating that the 1990 Act had worked well – enabling science and medicine to flourish within 
agreed parameters and promoting public confidence – the Government decided in 2005 that a review 
of the law and regulation in this area was “timely and desirable” in the light of technological 
developments in assisted reproduction and changing public attitudes (Department of Health, 2006, 
paras 1.2-1.3). When it reported in 2006, one of the review’s key outcomes was to reiterate the 
Government’s commitment (first announced in 2004) to creating the Regulatory Authority for Tissue 
and Embryos (RATE). The intention was that RATE would replace the HFEA and the Human Tissue 
Authority (HTA) with a single regulator with responsibilities across the range of human tissues, cells 
and blood (ibid, para 1.4). It was suggested that this merger would prevent overlapping regulation and 
ensure the application of “common principles and standards” across these “closely linked areas” (ibid, 
para 3.2). The Government’s proposal was for the creation of a RATE board, charged with taking a 
more strategic role, supported by (non-executive) Expert Advisory Panels (EAPs) to ensure that 
expertise would be available in all areas of activity within its remit (ibid, paras. 3.10-3.16).  
Following the publication of a draft Bill in May 2007, a Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny Committee was 
established. The Joint Committee’s report, in July 2007, found “overwhelming and convincing” 
evidence against establishing RATE (Joint Committee on the Human Tissue and Embryos (Draft) 
Bill, 2007, para 92). The Committee stated that, whilst there were some synergies between the work 
of the HFEA and HTA (ibid, para 60) and a merger offered some potential efficiencies and cost 
savings (ibid, para 61), there were also significant risks. The broad remit of RATE could result in a 
loss of both specialist expertise (ibid, para 76) and HFEA’s national and international reputation (ibid, 
para 73). There are also significant differences between the work of the HFEA and HTA (ibid, para 
69), and public confidence could be affected by the loss of a dedicated authority for embryos – which 
are widely regarded as meriting a special status (ibid, para 65). Moreover, RATE’s proposed structure 
could result in it being little more than a rubberstamping authority, with the EAPs functioning 
effectively as the HFEA and the HTA (ibid, para 85), and it would be possible to achieve some 
efficiencies without a formal merger (ibid, para 82). Following the Joint Committee’s report the 
Government decided not to proceed with RATE, and focussed instead on how the two authorities 
could work together to streamline their operations (Secretary of State for Health, 2007, para 17). 
The Joint Committee’s report also expressed concern that the draft Bill lacked “the explicit 
underpinning ethical framework which in 1990 was provided by the Warnock Report” (Joint 
Committee on the Human Tissue and Embryos (Draft) Bill, 2007, para 44). This was due, in part, to 
the fact that the Act being created was an amending statute. In other words: 
Nowhere was a blank piece of paper offered for reform, in a way that allowed for a thorough 
and fundamental rethinking of the kind of regulation which might best suit this area or the 
                                                     
1
 In January 2013 the HFEA reduced the size of its board from 19 members to 12. It reports that this “smaller 
board size is now widely recognised to be more effective” (Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, 
2014, p16). It has also gradually reduced its staff complement, from 86 in 2010/11 to 64 by the end of the 
2013/14 financial year (ibid). 
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ethical principles which should underpin it. Rather the architects of reform worked outwards 
from the provisions already in place, making the key question not ‘what model of law do we 
want?’ but rather ‘what needs to be changed? (McCandless and Sheldon, 2010, p180) 
So whilst the resulting Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 (the 2008 Act) made some 
significant changes – including: permitting the creation and use (under licence) of animal-human 
hybrid embryos for research purposes; prohibiting the selection of the sex of offspring for non-
medical reasons only (thereby allowing the screening of embryos to select a saviour sibling); 
removing the requirement to consider the future child’s “need for a father” when deciding whether a 
woman should be accepted for treatment services; and, providing for the first time that two women 
may be recognised as a child’s legal parents from the moment of birth – it also represented a missed 
opportunity in other important respects. For example, the way parenthood is framed within the 
legislation continues to prioritise married couples (even though this is at odds with other 
developments in family law), assume a two parent model and regard parents as occupying 
complementary yet different roles (hence a lesbian co-mother is not a mother but a female parent) 
(McCandless and Sheldon, 2010). The 2008 Act also made only minimal changes to the law and 
regulation of surrogacy. In particular, there remains a distinction between full surrogacy (to which the 
1990 Act applies
2
) and partial surrogacy (where there is a “regulatory vacuum” (Horsey and Sheldon, 
2012, p73)). This distinction is difficult to justify and in the latter case “leaves individuals dependent 
on the efforts of ‘well meaning amateurs’, who are prevented from charging the fees that would 
otherwise allow them to professionalise their services” (ibid, p87).3 
In addition to an appropriate ethical framework, the Joint Committee emphasised the importance of an 
“appropriate, consistent and workable regulatory architecture”. This entails “finding the right balance 
between flexibility and legal certainty” (Joint Committee on the Human Tissue and Embryos (Draft) 
Bill, 2007, para 49). Claiming that the Government had favoured legal certainty and, as a result, “been 
over-prescriptive in many areas in an attempt to provide for every eventuality”,4 the Joint Committee 
argued for “a more flexible approach within clearly defined parameters” (ibid, para 55). This principle 
of “devolved regulation” would, it suggested, provide regulators and clinicians with greater freedom 
of action and future-proof the legislation as technology continued to develop (ibid, para 56). In 
keeping with this more “permissive” approach, the Committee also recommended that the HFEA be 
given a statutory power to define areas of exemption from the regulatory remit where appropriate 
(ibid, para 105). These recommendations were not accepted by the Government, however, who 
asserted that “such a framework would introduce a lack of accountability” (ibid, para 8), “would 
cause uncertainty about the scope of regulation” (ibid, para 11), and “would be confusing and open up 
the HFEA to increased litigation and judicial review” (ibid, para 11). 
                                                     
2
 Although as Blyth (2012) notes the fact that this “became a vehicle for exercising some measure of regulation 
over surrogacy was largely serendipitous” (p309). 
3
 Some of the difficulties are illustrated by Re T (a child) (surrogacy: residence order) [2011] EWHC 33 (Fam). 
See further Alghrani, 2012; Vijay, 2014. 
4
 One possible example is the express prohibition of using reproductive technologies to ensure the birth of a 
child with a particular disability (2008 Act, s 14(4)). For an argument for a more flexible approach to this issue, 
see Taylor, 2010. 
The future of HFEA was examined again following the 2010 General Election. As part of its 
programme for Government the Coalition Government made a commitment to cut the number of 
health arm’s length bodies and reduce bureaucracy significantly. The Department of Health 
accordingly stated that the HFEA and HTA would be retained temporarily as separate arm’s length 
bodies, with a view to transferring their functions to other bodies by 2015 (Department of Health, 
2010). After a consultation found that the majority of respondents did not favour this proposal 
(Department of Health, 2013a), an independent review into the operation of the two bodies was set 
up, led by Justin McCracken. The McCracken report found that “There is almost universal praise for 
the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, and recognition that it is still fit for purpose” 
(McCracken, 2013, para 4.5). The report emphasised that the work of the HFEA and HTA is, by and 
large, separate, and that the “specialist expertise in the regulators and their understanding of the 
science underpinning commercial developments in the field were cited as critical, and important to 
preserve” (ibid, para 4.2). This specialist expertise was also found to be key to maintaining “[p]ublic 
confidence in the sensitive areas regulated by the HFEA” (ibid, para 4.1). Since a merger offered only 
“relatively modest additional cost savings” and “Much of the potential benefit of merger can be 
achieved by merging the two Finance and Resource groups while retaining the separate statutory 
entities with their respective Chairs, Chief Executives, and Boards” (ibid, para 4.18), the report 
recommended retaining the HFEA as a separate body. This was accepted by the Government 
(Department of Health, 2013b), and the recommendations have since been implemented (Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, 2014). 
In her comparison of the UK’s and US’s approaches to human embryonic stem cell research, 
Schechter (2010) states that: 
To some, it may seem counterintuitive that the United Kingdom, with its stringent regulatory 
and licensing standards, would be more effective at encouraging research than the United 
States and it relatively lax, unrestrictive approach. However, considering the state of the 
science in this field, the level of uncertainty created by the lack of uniformity and oversight, 
and the benefits of comprehensive regulation, the federal government needs to play an active 
role in this area if it wants to see real, competitive progress (p629) 
The regulatory oversight provided by HFEA has, she argues, allowed the UK to develop a “consistent 
and progressive” approach (ibid, p620). By contrast, in her discussion of whether the Netherlands 
should create a similar regulatory body to the HFEA, Zeegers (2014) has suggested that such a model 
can result in “bad politics” (p13). Using hybrid embryos as a case study, and pointing in particular to 
the fact those who opposed the creation of hybrid embryos on moral and ethical grounds were not 
only “misled by the idea that the creation of true hybrid embryos would not be at issue” but also had 
their beliefs “turned into an argument for facilitating an even wider range of human animal forms of 
embryo” (ibid, p27), she argues that the regulatory mechanism resulted in “a neutralization and 
downplaying instead of a real reconciliation of differences in moral views” (ibid, p26). This resonates 
with a comment in the McCracken report which, whilst generally very positive, did assert that there is 
“a fairly widespread sense that the HFEA needs to do more to properly take into account stakeholder 
views and to be seen to do so” (McCracken, 2013, para 4.5). 
 
The manufacture and distribution of chemicals 
The ubiquitous use of chemicals (and chemical technologies) undoubtedly provides innumerable 
benefits to society but can also cause considerable damage to human health and/or the environment. 
As Stokes and Vaughan posit: “…chemicals can hold concurrent and fundamentally opposed 
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positions in our legal and social consciousness: being both savior and sinner in the same instant” 
(Stokes and Vaughan, 2013, p.435). The regulation of chemicals poses challenges of immense 
complexity, in at least three different ways. First, the central mechanism of chemicals control in the 
EU, the REACH Regulation (Regulation 1907/2006/EC (OJ L396/1 2006)) - an acronym for the 
Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals - is not designed with a single 
objective in mind (see generally Vaughan, 2015). Early EU action in this area (Council Directive 
67/548/EEC) was motivated primarily by single market aims and the desirability of correcting 
information asymmetries. In a modern context, the objectives of EU chemicals regulation have been 
extended to explicitly include the protection of human health and the environment, facilitate market 
integration and to promote innovation in the chemicals sector (Heyvaert, 2007, p.201). Second, 
chemicals regulation is essentially concerned with the identification and management of risk as 
informed by regulatory science (Funtowicz et al, 2000). The limitations of science conducted 
primarily to inform policy are well-documented. Regulatory science is often characterised by 
extrapolation: from high to low dosage levels, from animals to humans, from short-term to long-term 
exposure (Jones, 2007). As noted earlier, even where science is able to provide an accurate 
assessment of risk this in no way provides an answer to the difficult societal question of how much 
risk is acceptable – but this is a question that any regulatory regime must address. Finally, any 
chemicals regulatory scheme is faced with considerable challenges of scale. While the exact number 
of chemicals on the market is unknown, the REACH Regulation is only applicable to chemicals 
manufactured or imported in the EU at or over one tonne per annum. The European Chemicals 
Agency expects at least 30,000 existing chemicals to be registered in this category by 2018 (European 
Chemicals Agency, 2015). These complexities have unquestionably shaped the substance and form of 
EU chemicals policy. 
REACH is a legislative instrument of immense complexity, density and length. The text of the 
consolidated version is over 130,000 words in length, accompanied by over a million words of 
guidance issued by the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA). Thus, only the briefest of summaries is 
possible here!  
The title “REACH” encapsulates the full range of regulatory mechanisms utilised by the regime. A 
staged approach is adopted commencing with the registration of chemicals, followed by their 
evaluation and then, where applicable (depending on the outcome of evaluation), their authorisation 
and possible restriction. The first of these steps – the registration process – is arguably the most 
significant. Here a ‘no data, no market’ approach is employed. Manufacturers or importers of 
chemicals must apply for registration, a process which involves the submission of a technical data file 
supplying, inter alia, the identity of the chemical, its intended use, physical properties and 
toxicological/ecotoxicological information (art.12(1)). This process represents a reversal of the 
traditional approach to market regulation for the purposes of environmental protection:  
Whereby most environmental regulation operates as a limit on market activity, ‘you can do 
what you like but not x’. Such laws dictate what particular kinds of behavior are not allowed. 
In contrast, registration is operating as a precondition to market activity (Fisher, 2008, p.553). 
A further noteworthy feature of the registration requirement is that the duty to conduct the necessary 
risk assessments is delegated to private actors.  
Following registration, a substantive evaluation of the registered information is required for all 
chemicals manufactured or imported in quantities exceeding 100 tonnes or (irrespective of volume) 
where the data supplied raises concerns about health and/or environmental impacts (art.44(2)). An 
EU-wide rolling action plan has been established, where a substance targeted for evaluation is 
allocated to a Member State to act as rapporteur. When concerns are confirmed, evaluation may 
trigger further measures, such as the inclusion of the chemical on the list of substances subject to 
authorisation, or the drafting of risk reduction measures. All chemicals designated as ‘Substances of 
Very High Concern’ (SVHC) require authorisation before they can be marketed or used within the EU 
(art.56). Firms are required to offer proof that the risks created by the SVHC are either ‘adequately 
controlled’ or there is a ‘socio-economic need for their continued use, while no viable alternative 
currently exists’ (title VII). This authorisation process therefore encompasses the principle of 
substitution, namely, if safer alternatives exist the SVHC must be phased out. The Commission is 
ultimately responsible for authorisation, which must be granted if the risks are shown to be adequately 
controlled. If this proves to be impossible, the Commission may still grant authorisation taking into 
account the severity of the risk and the viability of alternative substances. In reaching its decision the 
Commission has to follow the advisory comitology procedure under scrutiny (art.64(8)). While a 
detailed examination of this procedure is beyond the scope of this chapter, a central feature is the 
significant influence of the European Parliament, which can oppose a Commission authorisation 
proposal with a simple majority. Finally, for those substances which pose unacceptable risks to human 
health and the environment, restrictions represent the ultimate safety net. Restrictions take many 
forms, from a total ban to not being permitted to supply a substance to the general public. 
The REACH Regulation is a multi-faceted legislative instrument which adopts a variety of different 
approaches. As well as mechanisms which may be termed ‘command and control’ (authorisation, 
restriction) it also relies on essentially market-based instruments (registration, provision of 
information). Similarly, the system is both centralised (integral role for the Commission, ECHA, etc.) 
and devolved (obligation on private actors to provide technical data). Of especial relevance to this 
chapter is the registration and provision of information requirement. 
From one perspective, the obligation placed on private actors to register technical data relating to 
chemical risks is a practical necessity given the sheer volume of substances manufactured and 
marketed within the EU. It may be seen as a workload sharing mechanism (Fleurke and Somesen, 
2011, p.372). However, the requirement also has a substantive rationale. In an unregulated world, 
producers and manufacturers would have few incentives to provide information about chemical risks. 
As Wagner has noted:  
Actors who create externalities are best suited to access and produce information on the 
nature of the harms that their activities cause, but they also stand to lose from providing such 
information (Wagner, 2004, p.1648). 
Thus, by requiring the provision of information as condition of entry to the EU chemicals market, the 
‘no data, no market’ principle may be seen as a form of regulated self-regulation. In addition to an 
entry requirement, the registration requirement has other functions. First, the risk assessment which 
forms the basis of the registered information might highlight risks which can trigger evaluation, 
authorisation and restriction measures. And, second, the provision of data is essentially a market-
based mechanism capable of providing information to all participants in the supply chain including 
the end consumers of products. Where risks are deemed unacceptable to the market, the responding 
purchasing (in)activity will send a clear signal to those further up the supply chain (Case, 2005, 
p.383). This in turn might advance the goals of innovation, protection of health and protection of the 
environment by providing an incentive to manufacturers to produce substances which pose less 
significant risks. This objective is supported by the maintenance of a publicly accessible database 
administered by the ECHA.  
In one sense it is difficult to disagree with the assertion that all participants in a market should be 
granted access to fullest body of information possible; indeed information asymmetry is seen as a 
significant cause of market failure. However, the desirability of the approach adopted by REACH has 
To appear in M R McGuire & T J Holt (eds) The Routledge Handbook of Technology, Crime and 
Justice 
not been accepted axiomatically. Durodie, for example, has referred to the ‘social cost of fear 
reduction’ and questioned the need for the risk assessment obligation for existing substances: 
Accordingly, while one might usually favour seeking to obtain the greatest possible amount 
of evidence in deliberating upon matters, there would appear to be a clear need in this 
instance to maintain some sense of perspective and priorities. This is especially so as most of 
the chemicals now being required to be tested have been in use for a quarter-century or more 
and have effectively acquired billions of hours of exposure data through consumption or use 
(Durodie, 2003, p.390).
 
 
In a similar, more hyperbolic vein, the REACH Regulation has been described as “economic suicide 
by a massive self-administered regulatory overdose” (Logomasini and Miller, 2005, p.13). In addition 
to such concerns based on the fear of over-regulation, doubts have been expressed about the 
effectiveness of informational regulation, based on the public’s ability to engage fully with a highly 
technical area: 
Data produced in accordance with registration requirements and housed on ECHA’s website 
are dense and technical and beyond the means of comprehension of the vast majority of EU 
citizens. At the same time, users of chemicals have been provided with Safety Data Sheets 
(which detail risks and risk mitigation measures) by chemical manufacturers and importers 
that are now, thanks to REACH, up to 1,000 pages long per substance and, as a consequence, 
often meaningless. The quality of the data produced to date has also been poor, a fact 
recognised by both ECHA and the Commission. Put simply, more information is not always 
better information (Stokes and Vaughan, 2013, p.427).  
One possible counter to such arguments is the existence of environmental pressure groups and other 
NGOs, who might possess the necessary expertise and therefore perform a watch-dog role capable of 
pressurising the chemicals sector (Case, 2005, pp.420-423). Even eight to nine years after the 
enactment of REACH, the slow transmission rate of market information means it is still too early to 
discern the efficacy of its registration and information requirements.  
 
The disposal of hazardous waste 
In June 1987 – following the discovery, in Africa and other parts of the developing world, of illicit 
dumps of imported hazardous waste – the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 
established a working group tasked with elaborating a global convention on the control of 
transboundary movements of such wastes. But whilst there was a growing recognition of the threat 
posed by hazardous waste to both human health and the environment, and of the difficulties 
developing countries have in managing waste (Shearer, 1993), the application of more exacting 
environmental standards in the developed world had meant that “dumping in the less regulated (or 
unregulated) developing world [had become] a cheaper and more commercially attractive option” 
(Morrow, 2010, p219). Unsurprisingly, then, the debates on the new convention were “politicized, 
arduous and emotionally charged” (Kummer, 1998, p227). The resultant Basel Convention on the 
Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal was adopted on 22 
March 1989, and entered into force on 5 May 1992. To date, it has been ratified by 183 countries 
(Basel Convention, 2015). 
In keeping with its stated aim of reducing the transboundary movement of hazardous waste, the Basel 
Convention imposes a general, non-legally enforceable,
5
 obligation on States to reduce the generation 
of hazardous waste to a minimum (Article 4(2)(a)) and to ensure that adequate disposal facilities are 
available within their jurisdiction for the environmentally sound management (ESM) of hazardous 
waste (Article 4(2)(b)). The Convention also prohibits the export of hazardous waste to Antartica, to 
states that are not party to the Basel Convention, and to states that have banned the import of 
hazardous waste (Article 4). But the Convention stops short of imposing a total ban on exporting such 
waste. First, Article 4(9)(a) permits the transboundary movement of hazardous waste if the exporting 
state lacks “the technical capacity and the necessary facilities, capacity or suitable disposal sites in 
order to dispose of the wastes in question in an environmentally sound and efficient manner”. Waste 
may therefore be moved to another state in which its disposal will be managed in an environmentally 
sound manner. Second, Article 4(9)(b) allows wastes to be exported if they “are required as a raw 
material for recycling or recovery industries in the State of import” (Article 4(9)(b)). This recognises 
the fact that waste has a “dual character” (Morrow, 2010, p228), as both pollutant and tradable 
resource. 
The regulatory framework for exporting hazardous waste is based on the principle of Prior Informed 
Consent (PIC). Article 6(1) requires the authorities of the exporting state to notify the authorities of 
the prospective states of import and transit of the proposed transboundary movement. The movement 
may only proceed once all states concerned have given their written consent, including confirmation 
of the existence of a contract between the exporter and the disposer specifying environmentally sound 
management of the waste in question (Article 6(3)(b)). Importantly, Article 4(10) stipulates that the 
state that generated the hazardous waste cannot transfer its obligation to manage the waste in an 
environmentally sound manner to a transit or import state. This notion of cradle-to-grave liability 
underpins the duty (found in Article 8) to re-import wastes when their movement cannot be completed 
in accordance with the terms of the contract, and is also significant in cases where it is difficult to 
determine fault for an improper disposal. The principal weakness of the PIC mechanism, however, is 
that it relies on self-verification by states and so requires good faith from all concerned. This has a 
number of flaws. First, the exporting country may fail to verify that the facility accepting the waste in 
the importing country can manage it in an environmentally sound manner. This is compounded by the 
fact that the technical guidelines generated under the Convention are not mandatory, and so “a 
country attempting to self-verify a facility cannot assume that the destination country is observing the 
Basel ESM guidelines for a specific waste” (Gutierrez, 2014, p407). Second, the exception for wastes 
which are required for recycling or recovery in the importing state may be exploited, creating a 
“recycling loophole” (Gutierrez, 2014, p407). Data suggests that since the Convention entered into 
force a significant proportion of waste that was destined for final disposal has headed instead for 
recycling or further use (Gutierrez, 2014). It has even been suggested that “exporters often 
misrepresent the nature of the wastes, misleading importing nations into consenting” (Onzivu, 2013, 
p636). And, third, there is the possibility of corruption in the importing country: 
                                                     
5
 It is important to note that the reduction obligation is expressed in such qualified terms (and with no specific 
target) that it would make it extremely difficult to factually establish a breach; as such, it seems that the 
obligation to reduce the generation of hazardous waste represents a symbolic provision rather than a legally 
enforceable obligation. 
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Another weakness in the PIC procedure is its omission to account for the susceptibility of 
country consents to be obtained from corrupt local officials. It also ignores the economic 
motivation of poor countries to accept these types of wastes for either the value or money that 
the waste can contribute to the local economy. (Gutierrez, 2014, p407) 
In cases involving illegal traffic in hazardous waste, the Convention envisages a core role for criminal 
liability (Article 4(3)) alongside liability under civil law (Article 4(4)). But whilst a protocol on 
liability was adopted in 1999, this is not yet in force as it lacks the required number of ratifications. 
Since there is no liability regime under the Convention, parties must rely on domestic law for redress. 
Yet in many (developing) countries there is weak multi-sectoral co-ordination of waste management 
and monitoring of waste law (Onzivu, 2013). The Basel Convention does have some financial 
mechanisms, including the Basel Convention Trust Fund to Assist Developing Countries and other 
Countries in Need of Technical Assistance (the BD fund). But this too is problematic, since it is based 
on voluntary contributions by signatories who tend to accrue significant arrears (Morrow, 2010). 
Further mechanisms for promoting implementation and compliance include: regional training centres 
(BCRCs), which provide technical assistance for parties to safely manage hazardous and other wastes 
(Article 14(1)); a requirement to submit an annual report to the Conference of the Parties (Article 
13(3)); and, a duty to participate in hazardous waste audits conducted by the Secretariat (Article 
10(2)(b)). The effectiveness of these has also been questioned, with BCRCs lacking sufficient funding 
and capacity and states failing to submit national reports to the Secretariat (Onzivu, 2013). 
During the negotiations on the Basel Convention African countries, supported by other developing 
countries and environmental NGOs, had pushed for a total worldwide ban on transboundary 
movements of hazardous wastes, claiming that this was necessary to protect poorer regions from 
becoming the dumping grounds of the wealthy North (Kummer, 1998). When the Basel Convention 
was formally adopted the Organization of African Unity (OAU) expressed its disappointment at the 
lack of a total ban, stating that the restrictions imposed by the Convention “could be circumvented 
because of the lack of competent administrators and administrative agencies” (Shearer, 1993, p151). 
As a result, the OAU subsequently adopted the Bamako Convention, which creates a total ban on the 
importation of all hazardous wastes into Africa and limits the transfer of such wastes within Africa – 
thereby making the “difficult choice for most African countries placed between the double negative 
alternatives of ‘poverty or poison’” (Eze, 2007, p229). Importantly, the Bamako ban includes 
recycling and reclamation activities. This limits African industry to the use of traditional raw 
materials in production methods and, it has been suggested, underestimates the growing importance of 
waste as a valuable resource which can create green business opportunities and jobs (Kummer Peiry, 
2013). In fact, it has been argued that the “ambitious provisions” of the Bamako Convention are “so 
stringent” that they “threaten its enforceability” (Shearer, 1993, pp174-5). Pointing to “The complete 
absence of reported activities by the Bamako Secretariat and the Conference of the Parties” and the 
Probo Koala incident in the Ivory Coast in 2006, Eze concludes that “the lofty ideals of the 
Convention might be lost to the impossibility of compliance with its provisions” (2007, pp228-9). On 
the other hand, the Bamako Convention has an important symbolic effect, sending the message that 
African nations are not dumping grounds for hazardous wastes generated in other countries. It has 
also acted as a catalyst for other, similar, regional agreements, as well as the Basel Ban Amendment. 
The latter measure provides for a ban on the transfer of hazardous wastes for final disposal from 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to non-OECD countries. 
Although it has not yet been ratified by enough countries to bring it into force, the Ban Amendment 
has been ratified by, and so has legal effect in, the EU. 
Commentators have warned of the dangers of treaty congestion (Morrow, 2010; Onzivu, 2013). 
Treaty congestion further complicates this already-complex area. For a start, different treaties may 
have different ambits: for example, the Bamako Convention encompasses sea disposal of hazardous 
wastes, whereas the Basel Convention expressly excludes this from its scope (Article 4(12)). The two 
Conventions also define hazardous waste differently (Eze, 2007, pp216-7). Second, even if there is an 
attempt to delineate the scope of different treaties, the application of this in individual cases may be 
contested. In the Probo Koala incident, for example, one of the key issues was whether the sludge 
created by the floating refinery constituted hazardous waste or whether it was in fact slops, which are 
expressly excluded from the Basel Convention (Article 1(4)) and instead fall under the International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 1973 (the MARPOL Convention) (Morrow, 
2010). Similarly, there has debate as to whether end-of-life ships constitute hazardous waste, so that 
the Basel Convention applies to the shipbreaking industry (Karim, 2010). Third, the previous two 
points are compounded by the fact that the definition of waste depends on the view of its generator. 
This subjectivity allows “the waste disposer effectively to opt for obeying the regime that imposes the 
least demanding standards in the context of the disposal of hazardous waste in the developing world” 
(Morrow, 2010, p229). Moreover, the Convention’s definition of ESM as “taking all practicable steps 
to ensure that hazardous wastes or other wastes are managed in a manner which will protect human 
health and the environment against the adverse effects which may result from such wastes” (Article 
2(8)) is vague and open to different interpretations depending on one’s interests (Gutierrez, 2014). 
Such complexity and lack of clarity generates uncertainty. 
 
Public and expert voices in regulatory design in practice 
No legal or regulatory system can operate without significant discretionary power. As Bradley and 
Ewing observe, “If it is contrary to the rule of law that discretionary authority should be given to 
government departments or public officers, then the rule of law applies to no modern constitution” 
(2003, p94). Given the inevitability of discretion in every legal system, proponents of what has been 
dubbed the “extravagant version of the rule of law” (Davis, 1971, pp28-33) seek to eliminate as much 
discretion as possible. Beyond this they urge the need to “bring such discretion as is reluctantly 
determined to be necessary within the ‘legal umbrella’ by regulating it by means of general rules and 
standards and by subjecting its exercise to legal scrutiny” (Lacey, 1992, p372). One of the difficulties 
with this, however, is that it mistakenly assumes that there is a neat dichotomy between rules and 
discretion. In fact, the distinction between the two is far more uncertain (Galligan, 1986; Hawkins, 
1992). As the examples examined in this chapter illustrate, discretion is heavily implicated in the 
interpretation of regulatory norms and the application of them to technological processes and 
practices. Assessments under the REACH regime of whether the risks posed by a Substance of Very 
High Concern have been adequately controlled, whether there is a socio-economic need for the 
substance’s continued use and whether a viable alternative exists all involve discretionary judgement, 
as do decisions as to whether a state lacks the technical capacity and necessary facilities to dispose of 
hazardous waste in an environmentally sound and efficient manner and decisions as to whether a 
proposed research project involving embryos is necessary or desirable for the purpose of promoting 
advances in the treatment of infertility, increase knowledge about the causes of congenital disease or 
miscarriages, or develop more effective contraceptive techniques (1990 Act, Schedule 2, section 3). 
It is also apparent that, within each of the technological contexts examined in this chapter, certain 
viewpoints are prioritised in the exercise of this discretionary judgement. Perhaps most starkly, under 
the Basel Convention the view of the waste generator is relevant to the application of the definition of 
hazardous waste. Hence in the Probo Koala incident the company (Trafigura) that chartered the 
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floating refinery was able to contend that the 528 tons of sludge deposited around the city of Abidjan 
was in fact slops (governed by the MARPOL Convention), not hazardous waste (governed by the 
Basel Convention). And whilst a stated objective of both the HFEA and REACH frameworks is to 
promote public participation, the extent to which this objective is realised is open to question. As 
noted above, it has been suggested that the HFEA model results in bad politics. Whilst membership of 
the Authority includes a range of disciplinary perspectives, and there is a cap on the number of 
members who are doctors and scientists involved in human embryo research or fertility treatment, it is 
also the case that previous reviews have emphasised the important role the Authority plays in 
facilitating further innovation and development and that three of the seven current lay members are 
women who have previously received IVF treatment (Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, 
2015). Indeed, the McCracken report stated that the HFEA needs to do more to properly take into 
account stakeholder views (McCracken, 2013). Meanwhile, REACH’s registration process is, 
amongst other things, intended to operate as a mechanism for providing information to end consumers 
of products. But as has been pointed out, not only is the information provided normally dense and 
highly technical, meaning it is incomprehensible to the vast majority of members of the public, it is 
also often based on poor quality data and can be hundreds of pages in length. In reality, then, the 
opportunity for end consumers to contribute, via the market, to decisions about acceptable levels of 
risk is limited. 
As well as the role played by discretion and the prioritisation of certain viewpoints, a third recurring 
theme across the regimes for regulating technology examined here, as in many other contexts, is the 
importance of resource considerations. In spite of the high regard in which the HFEA is held, twice in 
less than a decade there have been proposals to merge it with the HTA for the sake of efficiency 
savings. Resource constraints also greatly hinder the operation of the Basel Convention, most 
obviously in the lack of third party verification of the PIC process. There is also a de facto lack of 
third party verification of the REACH registration process; with over 30,000 existing chemicals 
expected to be registered by 2018, the sheer magnitude of the regulatory task – and the level of 
resource that would be required to police this – means that the oversight of the ECHA is necessarily 
limited. Both regimes are thus, in effect, forms of “regulated self-regulation” (Crawford, 2003). This 
means, first, that the regulatory frameworks might be circumvented by those prepared to act in bad 
faith. As explained previously, the Basel Convention’s PIC process has been criticised on the grounds 
that exporting states might deceive importing states and vice versa. It is also possible that exporting 
and importing states might act in collusion. This is exacerbated by the fact that the protocol on 
liability is not yet in force and by the difficulties in taking action under domestic law. And whilst 
REACH requires each member state to maintain an enforcement regime which provides “effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive” penalties for non-compliance (Health and Safety Executive, 2015), this 
will prove little disincentive to those who wish to act in bad faith and who, as a result of the limited 
degree of oversight, perceive the likelihood of being caught to be low (von Hirsch et al, 1999). As 
well as bad faith, an additional possibility is a formalistic or minimalistic attitude towards compliance 
with the regulatory requirements. The frequent resort to the Basel Convention’s “recycling loophole”, 
for example, is at odds with the spirit of the Convention and the ESM principle. Similarly, during the 
REACH registration process manufacturers or importers of chemicals might submit a file that 
provides the required data but does so in a partial or selective manner. Meanwhile those who act in 
good faith and seek to comply fully with the regulatory requirements risk being rendered 
uncompetitive – both in comparison to those who do not comply fully and those who sit outside the 
regulatory regime in question. For example, concern has been expressed that the Bamako Convention 
will increase the cost of doing business in Africa and act as a disincentive to foreign investors (Eze, 
2007), whilst to comply fully with the burdensome requirements of the REACH regime may result in 
“paralysis by analysis” (Jones, 2007, p.356) – not only leaving European businesses less competitive 
than those from other parts of the globe but also potentially reducing social utility by slowing product 
development. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter began by outlining why public participation has been deemed a principle of good 
regulation, and explaining the tension between this objective and considerations of resource and 
expertise. It then examined this tension in the context of three specific regulatory regimes. The 
chapter has shown that in each of these regimes certain viewpoints are prioritised in the exercise of 
the discretionary decision-making that the regimes inevitably contain. What is striking about this is 
that, in each context, the viewpoint that is prioritised emanates from within the regulated industry: 
whether it is IVF doctors, researchers or patients; waste generators; or, chemical manufacturers and 
importers. Moreover, resource constraints mean that the latter two are effectively left to self-regulate, 
whilst public confidence in the HFEA is consistently attributed to its expert status. This not only 
raises questions about the extent to which these regulatory regimes do in fact exert effective control 
over the activities in question, but also whether the limited scope for public participation diminishes 
the legitimacy of these decision-making processes. 
By way of conclusion, it is worth returning to the false dichotomy between rules and discretion noted 
earlier. As Hawkins observes, to suggest that “discretion in the real world may be constrained only by 
legal rules” is to “overlook the fact that it is also shaped by political, economic, social and 
organizational forces outside the legal structure” (Hawkins, 1992, p38). At a time when regulators 
resort all too readily to the enactment of new laws as a response to societal challenges (Ashworth, 
2000), it is important to appreciate not only the limitations of legal regulation of technological 
processes and practices, but also to recognize – and seek to harness – the potential role of these extra-
legal constraints. 
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